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Abstract
Financial services decisions can have enormous consequences for household well-being. Households need a
range of financial services—to conduct basic transactions,
such as receiving their income, storing it, and paying bills;
to save for emergency needs and long-term goals; to access
credit; and to insure against life’s key risks. But the financial
services system is exceedingly complicated and often not
well-designed to optimize household behavior. In response
to the complexity of our financial system, there has been a
long-running debate about the appropriate role and form
of regulation. Regulation is largely stuck in two competing
models—disclosure, and usury or product restrictions.
This paper explores a different approach, based on
insights from behavioral economics on the one hand,
and an understanding of industrial organization on the
other. At the core of the analysis is the interaction between
individual psychology and market competition. This is in
contrast to the classic model, which relies on the interaction between rational choice and market competition. The
introduction of richer psychology complicates the impact
of competition. It helps us understand that firms compete
based on how individuals will respond to products in the
marketplace, and competitive outcomes may not always
and in all contexts closely align with improved decisional
choice and increased consumer welfare.
The paper adopts a behavioral economic framework that
considers firm incentives to respond to regulation. Under
this framework, outcomes are an equilibrium interaction
between individuals with specific psychologies and firms
that respond to those psychologies within specific market

contexts. Regulation must then address failures in this
equilibrium. The model suggests, for example, that in
some contexts market participants seek to overcome common human failings (as for example, with under-saving)
while in other contexts market participants seek to exploit
these failings (as for example, with over-borrowing).
Behaviorally informed regulation needs to take account of
these different contexts.
The paper discusses the specific application of these
forces to the case of mortgage, credit card, and banking
markets. The purpose of this paper is not to champion policies, but to illustrate how a behaviorally informed regulatory analysis would lead to a deeper understanding of the
costs and benefits of specific policies. To further that understanding, in particular, the paper discusses ten ideas:
• Full information disclosure to debias home mortgage
borrowers.
• A new standard for truth in lending.
• A “sticky” opt-out home mortgage system.
• Restructuring the relationship between brokers and
borrowers.
• Using framing and salience to improve credit card
disclosures.
• An opt-out payment plan for credit cards.
• An opt-out credit card.
• Regulating of credit card late fees.
• A tax credit for banks offering safe and affordable
accounts.
• An opt-out bank account for tax refunds.

Michael S. Barr is Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School; senior fellow Center for American Progress; nonresident
senior fellow, Brookings Institution. Sendhil Mullainathan is Professor of Economics, Harvard University. Eldar Shafir is Professor of
Psychology and Public Affairs, Princeton University. The authors conduct research and development on public policy through Ideas42,
with support from the Hewlett Foundation and the Russell Sage Foundation. The authors wish to thank Ellen Seidman and the New
America Foundation for suggesting we undertake this project and for their ongoing support and encouragement.

Financial services decisions can have enormous consequences for household wellbeing. Households need a range of financial services—to conduct basic transactions, such as receiving their income, storing it, and paying bills; to save for emergency needs and long-term goals; to access credit; and to insure against life’s key
risks. But the financial services system is exceedingly complicated and often not
well-designed to optimize household behavior. For example, choosing a mortgage
is one of the biggest financial decisions an American consumer will make, but it
can be a complicated one, especially in today’s environment where the terms and
features of mortgages vary in multiple dimensions. Similarly, credit card contracts
now often involve complicated terms and features that may encourage sub-optimal borrowing behavior. And it has long been remarked that households fail to
optimize in their savings decisions.
In response to the complexity of our financial system,
there has been a long-running debate about the appropriate role and form of regulation. Regulation is largely
stuck in two competing models—disclosure, and usury
or product restrictions. Disclosure regulation, embodied
in the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), presumes one market
failure: the market will fail to produce a clear and comparable disclosure of essential product information needed
by consumers. TILA responds, potentially, to two types of
problems. First, firms will not reveal all information, for
example, regarding the desirability of various features, that
borrowers should understand and be able to analyze in
determining whether to take out a loan. Second, firms will
not reveal information in a way that facilitates comparability across products. The first concern speaks to consumer
knowledge, “solving” the problem through the provision
of information; the second concern addresses consumers’
ability to process the information, “solving” the problem
through coordination of terms and definitions.
Homo economicus is very much the intellectual basis for
disclosure regulation. The model relies on fully rational
agents who make intelligent choices. But these neoclassical assumptions are misplaced and in many contexts consequential. In particular, behavioral research has shown
that the availability of data does not always lead to commu-

nication and knowledge; understanding and intention do
not necessarily lead to action; and contextual nuances can
lead to poor choices. Individuals consistently make choices
that, they themselves agree, diminish their own well-being
in significant ways.

Regulation is largely stuck in two competing
models—disclosure, and usury or product
restrictions.
By contrast to disclosure regulation, usury laws and product restrictions start from the idea that certain prices
or products are inherently unreasonable, and that consumers need to be protected from making bad choices.
But product regulation may in some contexts diminish
access to credit or reduce innovation of financial products. Moreover, for certain types of individuals, some
limitations may themselves increase consumer confusion regarding what rules apply to which products, and
what products may prove beneficial or harmful. In addition, firms will likely develop ways around such product
restrictions, undermining their core intention, increasing
costs and further confusing consumers.
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We explore a different approach, based on insights from
behavioral economics on the one hand, and an understanding of industrial organization on the other. At the core of our
analysis is the interaction between individual psychology and
market competition. This is in contrast to the classic model,
which relies on the interaction between rational choice and
market competition. In the classic model, absent market
failures, because rational agents choose well, firms compete
to provide products that improve welfare. Because rational
agents process information well, firms compete to provide
information that improves decision quality. By contrast, in
our model, individuals depart from neo-classical assumptions in important ways. The introduction of richer psychology complicates the impact of competition. Now, firms compete based on how actual individuals will respond to products
in the marketplace, and actual competitive outcomes may
not always and in all contexts closely align with improved
decisional choice and increased consumer welfare.

We explore a different approach, based on
insights from behavioral economics on the
one hand, and an understanding of industrial organization on the other.

In the home mortgage market, for example, the standard
model assumes that people evaluate options well, and that
the more options people have, the better. Firms will thus
provide more options, people will pick the best ones, and
healthy competition will drive out bad options. In reality,
people are easily overwhelmed by too many options and
make mistakes, often in predictable ways. Borrowers, for
example, might pick the most salient dimension (lowest
monthly cost) rather than focusing on their cost of credit
over the expected life of their loan—or the fact that taxes
and insurance will not be escrowed and are not included in
the monthly cost. Consequently, firms can and will introduce options that cater to these behaviors, and people will
pick options that carry a greater likelihood of failure than
anticipated, and which they themselves would find suboptimal upon further reflection and analysis. These behavioral considerations suggest that disclosure of information
alone will often be insufficient to provide consumers with
what is needed to optimize their understanding and decision-making, and the resulting outcomes.
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Our work is clearly related to the emerging literature on
behaviorally informed policy-making. This literature produces novel considerations in the design and implementation of regulation, including features such as the framing
of information, the setting of defaults or “opt-out” rules,
the provision of warnings, and other strategies to alter individual behavior.2 In this paper, we embed this thinking
more deeply in the logic of markets. Specifically, we adopt a
framework that considers in more depth firm incentives to
respond to behaviorally motivated regulation. We envision
outcomes as an equilibrium interaction between individuals
with specific psychologies and firms that respond to those
psychologies within specific market contexts. Regulation
must then address failures in this equilibrium.
This perspective produces two dimensions to consider.
First, the psychological biases of individuals can either help
or hurt the firms they interact with; hence firms’ and public-minded regulators’ interests are sometimes mis-aligned
and sometimes not. Let us take the example of a consumer
who does not understand the profound effects of the compounding of interest. Such a bias would lead the individual
both to under-save, and to over-borrow. Society would prefer
that the individual did not have such a bias in both contexts.
Firms, however, would prefer that the individual not have
the bias to under-save so that funds available for investment
and fee generation would not diminish but, at least over the
short term (and excluding consideration of collection costs),
would be perfectly content to see the same individual overborrow. Because people are fallible and easily misled, transparency does not always pay off and firms sometimes have
strong incentives to exacerbate psychological biases by hiding borrowing costs. Regulation in this case faces a much
more difficult challenge than in the savings situation.

The psychological biases of individuals can
either help or hurt the firms they interact
with; hence firms’ and public-minded regulators’ interests are sometimes mis-aligned
and sometimes not.

The market response to individual failure can profoundly
affect regulation. In attempting to boost participation
in 401(k) retirement plans, the regulator faces at worst
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indifferent and at best positively inclined employers seeking to boost employee retention and to comply with federal
pension rules.3 In forcing disclosure of hidden prices of
credit, by contrast, the regulator often faces non-cooperative firms, whose interests are to find ways to work around
or undo interventions.
A second implication of our equilibrium model of firms in
particular markets interacting with individuals with specific
psychologies is that the mode of regulation chosen should
take account of this interaction. One might think of the regulator as holding two different levers, which we describe as
changing the rules and changing the scoring.4 When forcing
disclosure of the APR, for example, the regulator effectively
changes the “rules” of the game: what a firm must say. A
stronger form of rule change is product regulation: changing what a firm must do. Behavioral rule changes, such as
creating a favored starting position or default, fall between
these two types. When changing liability or providing tax
incentives, by contrast, the regulator changes the way the
game is “scored”. Typically, changing the rules of the game
without changing the scoring maintains the firms’ original
incentives to help or hurt consumer bias, channeling the
incentive into different behaviors by firms or individuals.
In contrast, changing the scoring of the game (as through
liability changes) can alter those incentives.
This perspective highlights the care that must be taken
when transferring the insights of the most prominent

example of behavioral regulation—defaults in 401(k) participation—to other domains. According to the present
analysis, changing the rules on retirement saving (by introducing defaults) works well because employers’ incentives
align (or do not mis-align) with regulatory efforts to guide
individual choice. In other words, under current conditions, employers are either unaffected or may even be hurt
by individuals’ propensity to under-save in 401(k) plans.5
They thus will not lean against an attempt to fix that problem. In contrast, in circumstances where firms’ incentives
misalign with regulatory intent, changing the rules alone
may not work well since firms may have the ability to work
creatively around those rule changes. Under those conditions, psychological rules such as defaults or framing may
be too weak, and changes in liability rules or other measures may be necessary, as we explain below.
This distinction in market responses to individual psychology is central to our framework and is illustrated in Table
1. In some cases, the market is either neutral or wants to
overcome consumer fallibility. In other cases, the market
would like to exploit or exaggerate consumer fallibility.
The different provider incentives generated by consumer
lack of understanding about the compounding of interest
in the saving and borrowing contexts is discussed above.
Similarly, when consumers procrastinate in signing up
for the EITC (and hence in filing for taxes) private tax
preparation firms have incentives to help remove this procrastination so as to increase their customer base. When

Table 1. The Firm and the Individual
Behavioral Fallibility

Consumers misunderstand
compounding

Market neutral and/or wants to
overcome consumer fallibility

Market exploits consumer fallibility

Consumers misunderstand
compounding in savings

Consumers misunderstand
compounding in borrowing

› Banks would like to reduce this to
increase savings base

› Banks would like to exploit this to
increase borrowing

Consumers procrastinate in signing
up for EITC
Consumers procrastinate

› Tax filing companies would like to
reduce this so as to increase number
of customers

behaviorally informed financial services regulation

Consumers procrastinate in returning
rebates
› Retailers would like to exploit this to
increase revenues
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consumers procrastinate in returning rebates (but make
retail purchases as if they are going to get a rebate), retailers benefit. Note the parallelism in these examples: firm
incentives to alleviate or exploit a bias are not an intrinsic
feature of the bias itself. Instead, they are a function of how
the bias plays itself out in the particular market structure.
In the consumer credit market, one worries that many
firm-individual interactions are of the kind where firms
seek to exploit rather than alleviate bias. If true, this
raises the concern of over-extrapolating from the 401(k)
defaults example to credit products. To the extent that
401(k) defaults work because optimal behavior is largely
aligned with market incentives, other areas, such as credit
markets, might be more difficult to regulate with mere
defaults. Furthermore, if the credit market is dominated
by “low-road” firms offering opaque products that “prey”
on human weakness, it is more likely that regulators of such
a market will be captured because “high road” interests are
too weak to push back against “low road” players; that market forces will defeat positive defaults sets; and that “lowroad” players will continue to dominate. Many observers, for
example, believe that the credit card markets are, in fact, currently dominated by such “low road” firms (see, e.g., Mann
2007; Bar-Gill 2004) and that formerly “high road” players
have come to adopt the sharp practices of their low-road
competitors. If government policy makers want to attempt
to use defaults in such contexts, they might need to deploy
“stickier” defaults or more aggressive policy options.
Table 2 illustrates a conceptual approach to the issue of
regulatory choice. In this stylized model, the regulator can
either change the rules of the game or change the scoring
of the game. Setting a default is an example of changing the
rules of the game, as is disclosure regulation. Specifically,
the rules of the game are changed when there’s an attempt
to change the nature of firm-individual interactions, as
when the regulation attempts to affect what can be said,
offered or done. Changing the scoring of the game, by contrast, changes the payoffs a firm will receive for particular
outcomes. This may be done without a particular rule about
how the outcome is to be achieved. For example, pension
regulation that penalizes firms whose 401(k) plan enrollment is top-heavy with high-paid executives is an example
of how scoring gives firms incentives to enroll low-income
individuals without setting particular rules on how this is
done. Changing rules and changing scoring often accompany each other, but they are conceptually distinct.
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Table 2. Changing the Game
Rules

Set the defaults in 401(k) savings
Organ donation

Scoring

401(k) top heavy requirements for tax
Grants to states that enroll organ donors

Table 3 weaves these two dimensions together, illustrating how regulatory choice ought to be analyzed according to the market’s stance towards human fallibility. In
what follows, we discuss the specific application of these
forces to the case of mortgage, credit card, and banking
markets, with specific proposals that fall into each bin.
Among other things, the discussion illustrates how policies in the top-right-hand corner of Table 3 face a particular challenge. Changing the rules of the game alone
will be difficult when firms are highly motivated to find
work-arounds. As such, when we suggest opt-out policies
in mortgages below, the challenge will be to find ways to
make these starting positions “sticky” so that firms do not
simply undo their default nature. In our judgment, both
achieving a good default and figuring out how to make it
work requires separating low-road from high road firms
and making it profitable for high road firms to offer
the default product (for a related concept, see Kennedy,
2005). For that to work, the default must be sufficiently
attractive to consumers, sufficiently profitable for “high
road” firms to succeed in offering it, and penalties associated with deviations from the default must be sufficiently
costly so as to make the default “stick” even in the face of
market pressures from “low road” firms. It may be that
in some credit markets, low road firms have become so
dominant that “sticky” defaults will be ineffectual.

The default must be sufficiently attractive to
consumers, sufficiently profitable for “high
road” firms to succeed in offering it, and
penalties associated with deviations from the
default must be sufficiently costly so as to
make the default “stick” even in the face of
market pressures from “low road” firms.

new america foundation

Moreover, achieving such a default is likely more costly
than making defaults work when market incentives align,
not least because the costs associated with the stickiness
of the default involve greater dead-weight losses given that
there will be higher costs to opt-out for those for whom
deviating from the default is optimal. These losses would
need to be weighed against the losses from the current system, as well as against losses from alternative approaches,
such as disclosure or product regulation. Nonetheless,
given the considerations above, it seems worth exploring
whether such “sticky” defaults can help to transform consumer financial markets.

Table 3. Behaviorally Informed Regulation

Rules

Market neutral
and/or wants to
overcome consumer fallibility

Market exploits consumer fallibility

Public education
on saving

Opt-out mortgage or
credit card

Direct deposit/
auto-save

Information debiasing
on debt (full information disclosure, payoff
time for credit cards)

Licensing

Scoring

Tax incentives
for savings
vehicles
IRS Direct
Deposit
Accounts

Penalties to make optout system sticky

Instead, we illustrate how a behaviorally informed regulatory analysis would lead to a deeper understanding of the
costs and benefits of specific policies. We explore ten ideas
to illustrate our conceptual approach in three main areas of
borrowing and saving: home mortgage regulation, credit
card regulation, and the provision of bank accounts.

Behaviorally Informed Home
Mortgage Regulation
Full Information Disclosure to Debias Borrowers
With the advent of nationwide credit reporting systems and
refinement of credit scoring and modeling, the creditor and
broker know information about the borrower that the borrower does not necessarily know about himself, including
not just his credit score, but his likely performance regarding a particular set of loan products. Creditors will know
whether the borrower could qualify for a better, cheaper
loan, as well as the likelihood that the borrower will meet his
obligations under the existing mortgage, or become delinquent, refinance, default or go into foreclosure. Yet lenders
are not required to reveal this information to borrowers.
At the same time, the lack of disclosure of such information is likely exacerbated by consumer beliefs. Consumers
likely have false background assumptions regarding what
brokers and creditors reveal to them about their borrowing
status. What if consumers believe the following:
“Creditors reveal all information about me
and the loan products I am qualified to receive.
Brokers work for me in finding me the best loan
for my purposes, and lenders offer me the best
loans for which I qualify. I must be qualified for
the loan I have been offered, or the lender would
not have validated the choice by offering me the
loan. Because I am qualified for the loan that must
mean that the lender thinks that I can repay the
loan. Why else would they lend me the money?
Moreover, the government tightly regulates home
mortgages; they make the lender give me all these
legal forms. Surely the government must regulate
all aspects of this transaction.”

Ex post liability
standard for truth in
lending
Broker fiduciary duty
and/or changing
compensation (Yield
Spread Premiums)

The default example is just one of a set of examples we
discuss as potential regulatory interventions based on
our conceptual framework. As noted above, given market
responses to relevant psychological factors in different
contexts, regulation may need to take a variety of forms,
including some that while informed by psychology are not
designed to affect behavioral change but rather to alter
the structure of the market in which relevant choices are
made. Given the complexities involved, the purpose of this
white paper is not to champion the specific policies below.

In reality, the government does not regulate as the borrower
believes, and the lender does not necessarily behave as the
borrower hopes. Instead, information is hidden from the
borrower, information that would improve market compe-
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tition and outcomes. Given the consumer’s probably false
background assumptions and the reality of asymmetric
information favoring the lender and broker, we suggest
that creditors be required to reveal useful information to
the borrower at the time of the mortgage loan offer, including disclosure of the borrower’s credit score, and the borrower’s qualifications for the all of the lender’s mortgage
products. Brokers could even be required to reveal the
wholesale rate sheet pricing—the rates at which lenders
would be willing to lend to this type of borrower. Such an
approach corresponds to the use of debiasing information,
in the top right of Table 3.

Given the consumer’s probably false background assumptions and the reality of asymmetric information favoring the lender and
broker, we suggest that creditors be required
to reveal useful information to the borrower
at the time of the mortgage loan offer, including disclosure of the borrower’s credit score,
and the borrower’s qualifications for the all
of the lender’s mortgage products.

The goal of these disclosures would be to put pressure on
creditors and brokers to be honest in their dealings with
applicants. The additional information might improve comparison shopping and perhaps outcomes. Of course, revealing such information would also reduce broker and creditor
profit margins. But if the classic market competition story
relies on full information, and assumes rational behavior
based on understanding, one can view this proposal as
simply attempting to remove market frictions from information failures, and move the market competition model
more towards its ideal. By reducing information asymmetry, full information disclosure would help to debias consumers and lead to better competitive outcomes.

Ex Post Standards-based Truth in Lending
Optimal disclosure will not simply occur in all markets
through competition alone. Competition under a range of
plausible scenarios will not necessarily generate psychologically informative and actionable disclosure, as the cur-
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rent crisis in the subprime mortgage sector suggests may
have occurred. If competition does not produce informative disclosure, disclosure regulation might be necessary.
But simply because disclosure regulation is needed does
not mean it will work. Regulating disclosure appropriately
is difficult and requires substantial sophistication by regulators, including psychological insight.
A behavioral perspective could focus on improving disclosures themselves. The goal of disclosure should be to improve
the quality of information about contract terms in meaningful ways. That would suggest, for example, that simply
adding information is unlikely to work. Disclosure policies
are effective to the extent that they present a frame—a way
of perceiving the disclosure—that is both well understood
and conveys salient information that helps the decisionmaker act optimally. It is possible, for example, that information about the failure frequency of of particular products
might help (“2 out of 10 borrowers who take this kind of
loan default”), but proper framing can be difficult to achieve
and to maintain consistently, given that it may vary across
situations. Moreover, the attempt to improve decision quality through an improvement in consumer understanding,
which is presumed to change the consumer’s intentions to
act, and finally her actual actions, is fraught with difficulty.
There is often a gap between understanding and intention,
and particularly between intention and action.

Disclosure policies are effective to the extent
that they present a frame—a way of perceiving the disclosure—that is both well understood and conveys salient information that
helps the decision-maker act optimally.

Furthermore, even if meaningful disclosure rules can be
created, sellers can undermine whatever before-the-fact
or ex ante disclosure rule is established, in some contexts
simply by “complying” with it: “Here’s the disclosure
form I’m supposed to give you, just sign here.” For example, with rules-based ex ante disclosure requirements
for credit, such as TILA, the rule is set up first, and the
firm (the discloser) moves last. While an ex ante rule provides certainty to creditors, whatever gave the discloser
incentives to confuse consumers remains in the face of
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the regulation. While officially complying with the rule,
there is market pressure to find other means to avoid the
salutary effects on consumer decisions that the disclosure
was intended to achieve.
In light of the difficulties of addressing such issues ex ante,
we propose that policy makers consider shifting away from
sole reliance on a rules-based, ex ante regulatory structure
for disclosure embodied in TILA and toward integration
of an ex-post, standards-based disclosure requirement as
well. Rather than a rule, we would deploy a standard, and
rather than an ex ante decision about content, we would
permit the standard to be enforced after loans are made.
In essence, courts or expert agencies would determine
whether the disclosure would have, under common understanding, effectively communicated the key terms of the
mortgage to the typical borrower. This approach could be
similar to ex post determinations of reasonableness of disclaimers of warranties in sales contracts under UCC 2-316
(See White & Summers, 1995). This type of policy intervention would correspond to a change in “scoring,” in the
lower right of Table 3.

We propose that policy makers consider
shifting away from sole reliance on a rulesbased, ex ante regulatory structure for disclosure embodied in TILA and toward integration of an ex-post, standards-based disclosure
requirement as well.

In our judgment, an ex post version of truth in lending
based on a reasonable person standard to complement
the fixed disclosure rule under TILA might permit innovation—both in products themselves and in strategies of
disclosure—while minimizing rule evasion. An ex-post
standard with sufficient teeth could change the incentives
of firms to confuse and would be more difficult to evade.
Under the current approach, creditors can easily “evade”
TILA, by simultaneously complying with its actual terms
while making the required disclosures regarding the terms
effectively useless in the context of the borrowing decisions
of consumers with limited attention and understanding.
TILA, for example, does not block a creditor from introduc-

ing a more salient term (“lower monthly cost!”) to compete
with the APR for borrowers’ attention. Under an ex post
standards approach, by contrast, lenders could not plead
compliance with TILA as a defense. Rather, the question
would be one of objective reasonableness: whether the
lender meaningfully conveyed the information required for
a typical consumer to make a reasonable judgment about
the loan. Standards would also lower the cost of specification ex ante. Clarity of contract is hard to specify ex ante but
easier to verify ex post. Over time, through agency action,
guidance, model disclosures, “no action” letters, and court
decisions, the parameters of the reasonableness standard
would become known and predictable.
While TILA has significant short-comings, we do not propose abandoning it. Rather, TILA would remain (with whatever useful modifications to it might be gleaned from our
increased understanding of consumers’ emotions, thought
processes and behaviors). Quite recently, for example, the
Federal Reserve Board unveiled major and useful changes
to its disclosure rules, based in part on consumer research.6
TILA would still be important in permitting comparisonshopping among mortgage products, one of its two central
goals. However, some of the burden of TILA’s second goal,
to induce firms to reveal information that would promote
better consumer understanding, would be shifted to the ex
post standard.
Of course, there would be significant costs to such an
approach, especially at first. Litigation or regulatory enforcement would impose direct costs and the uncertainty surrounding enforcement of the standard ex post might deter
innovation in the development of mortgage products. The
additional costs of compliance with a disclosure standard
might reduce lenders’ willingness to develop new mortgage products designed to reach lower-income or minority borrowers who might not be served by the firms’ plain
vanilla products. The lack of clear rules might also increase
consumer confusion regarding how to compare innovative
mortgage products to each other, even while it increases consumer understanding of the particular mortgage products
being offered. Even if one couples the advantages of TILA
for mortgage comparisons with the advantages of an ex post
standard for disclosure in promoting clarity, the net result
may simply be greater confusion with respect to cross-loan
comparisons. That is, if consumer confusion results mostly
from firm obfuscation, then our proposal will likely help a
good deal. By contrast, if consumer confusion in this context
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results mostly from market complexity in product innovation,
then the proposal is unlikely to make a major difference, and
other approaches focused on loan comparisons might be
warranted (see, e.g., Thaler & Sunstein (2008)).
Despite the shortcomings of an ex post standard for truth
in lending, we believe that such an approach is worth pursuing. To limit the costs associated with our approach, the
ex post determination of reasonableness could be significantly confined. For example, if courts are to be involved
in enforcement, the ex post standard for reasonableness
of disclosure might be limited to providing a (partial)
defense to payment in foreclosure or bankruptcy, rather
than being open to broader enforcement through affirmative suit. Alternatively, rather than court enforcement, the
ex post standard might be enforced by the bank regulators
or another expert consumer agency,7 through supervision
and enforcement actions. The ex post exposure might be
significantly reduced through ex ante steps. For example,
regulators might develop safe harbors for reasonable disclosures, issue model disclosures, use “no action” letters to
provide certainty to lenders, and the like. Moreover, firms
might be tasked with conducting regular surveys of borrowers or conducting experimental design research to validate
their disclosures, with positive results from the research
providing rebuttable presumptions of reasonableness, or
even safe harbors from challenge. The key is to give the
standard sufficient teeth without deterring innovation. The
precise contours of enforcement and liability are not essential to the concept, and weighing the costs and benefits of
such penalties is beyond the scope of what we hope to do
in introducing the idea here. Further work will be required
to detail the design for implementation.

“Sticky” Opt-Out Mortgage Regulation
While the causes of the mortgage crisis are myriad, a central problem was that many borrowers took out loans that
they did not understand and could not afford. Brokers and
lenders offered loans that looked much less expensive than
they really were, because of low initial monthly payments
and hidden, costly features. Families commonly make
mistakes in taking out home mortgages because they are
misled by broker sales tactics, misunderstand the complicated terms and financial tradeoffs in mortgages, wrongly
forecast their own behavior and misperceive their risks
of borrowing. How many homeowners really understand
how the teaser rate, introductory rate and reset rate relate
to the London interbank offered rate plus some specified
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margin, or can judge whether the prepayment penalty will
offset the gains from the teaser rate?
Improved disclosures might help. Altering the rules of the
game of disclosure, and altering the “scoring” for seeking
to evade proper disclosure, may be sufficient to reduce the
worst outcomes. However, if market pressures and consumer confusion are sufficiently strong, such disclosure
may not be enough. If market complexity is sufficiently disruptive to consumer choice, product regulation might prove
most appropriate. For example, by barring prepayment penalties, one could reduce lock-in to bad mortgages; by barring
short-term ARMs and balloon payments, one could reduce
refinance pressure; in both cases, more of the cost of the loan
would be pushed into interest rates and competition could
focus on a consistently stated price in the form of the APR.
Price competition would benefit consumers, who would be
more likely to understand the terms on which lenders were
competing. Product regulation would also reduce cognitive
and emotional pressures related to potentially bad decisionmaking by reducing the number of choices and eliminating
loan features that put pressure on borrowers to refinance on
bad terms. However, product regulation may stifle beneficial innovation and there is always the possibility that government may simply get it wrong.
For that reason, we propose a new form of regulation. We
propose that a default be established with increased liability exposure for deviations that harm consumers. For lack
of a better term, we call this a “sticky” opt-out mortgage
system.12 As with “opt out” regulation generally, a “sticky”
opt out system would fall, in terms of stringency, somewhere between product regulation and disclosure; however, for reasons we explain below, market forces would
likely swamp a pure “opt out” regime—that’s where the
need for stickiness comes in. This approach corresponds
to a combination of changing the rules of the game, in the
top right of Table 3, and changing liability rules, at the bottom right of that table.

We propose that a default be established with
increased liability exposure for deviations that
harm consumers. For lack of a better term, we
call this a “sticky” opt-out mortgage system.
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The proposal is grounded in our equilibrium model of firm
incentives and individual psychology. Borrowers may be
unable to distinguish among complex loan products and
act optimally based on such an understanding (see, e.g.,
Ausubel 1991). We thus deploy an opt-out strategy to make
it easier for borrowers to choose a standard product, and
harder for borrowers to choose a product that they are less
likely to understand. At the same time, lenders may seek
to extract surplus from borrowers because of asymmetric
information about future income or default probabilities
(see Musto 2007), and, in the short term, lenders and brokers may benefit from selling borrowers loans they cannot afford. Thus, a pure default would be undermined by
firms, and regulation needs to take account of this market
pressure by pushing back.
In our model, lenders would be required to offer eligible
borrowers a standard mortgage (or set of mortgages), such
as a fixed rate, self-amortizing 30 year mortgage loan,
according to reasonable underwriting standards. The precise contours of the standard set of mortgages would be
set by regulation. Lenders would be free to charge whatever interest rate they wanted on the loan, and, subject to
the constraints outlined below, could offer whatever other
loan products they wanted outside of the standard package. Borrowers, however, would get the standard mortgage
offered, unless they chose to opt out in favor of a non-standard option offered by the lender, after honest and comprehensible disclosures from brokers or lenders about the
terms and risks of the alternative mortgages. An opt-out
mortgage system would mean borrowers would be more
likely to get straightforward loans they could understand.
But for the reasons cited above, a plain-vanilla opt-out policy
is likely to be inadequate. Unlike the savings context, where
market incentives align well with policies to overcome behavioral biases, in the context of credit markets, firms often have
an incentive to hide the true costs of borrowing. Given the
strong market pressures to deviate from the default offer,
we would need to require more than a simple “opt out” to
make the default “sticky” enough to make a difference in
outcomes. Deviation from the offer would require heightened disclosures and additional legal exposure for lenders
in order to make the default “sticky.” Under our plan, lenders would have stronger incentives to provide meaningful
disclosures to those whom they convince to opt out, because
they would face increased regulatory scrutiny, or increased
costs if the loans did not work out.

Deviation from the offer would require
heightened disclosures and additional legal
exposure for lenders in order to make the
default “sticky.”

Future work will need to explore in greater detail the
enforcement mechanism. For example, under one potential approach to making the opt-out “sticky,” if default
occurs when a borrower opts out, the borrower could raise
the lack of reasonable disclosure as a defense to bankruptcy
or foreclosure. Using an objective reasonableness standard
akin to that used for warranty analysis under the Uniform
Commercial Code, if the court determined that the disclosure would not effectively communicate the key terms
and risks of the mortgage to the typical borrower, the court
could modify or rescind the loan contract.8 Another alternative would be to have the banking agencies (or another
expert consumer agency) enforce the requirement on a
supervisory basis, rather than relying on the courts. The
agency would be responsible for supervising the nature
of disclosures according to a reasonableness standard,
and would impose a fine on the lender and order corrective actions if the disclosures were found to be unreasonable. The precise nature of the “stickiness” required and
the tradeoffs involved in imposing these costs on lenders
would need to be explored in greater detail, but in principle, a “sticky” opt-out policy could effectively leverage the
behavioral insight that defaults matter with the industrial
organizational insight that certain market incentives work
against a pure opt-out policy.

A “sticky” opt-out policy could effectively
leverage the behavioral insight that defaults
matter with the industrial organizational
insight that certain market incentives work
against a pure opt-out policy.

An opt-out mortgage system with “stickiness” might provide several benefits over current market outcomes. Under
the plan, a plain vanilla set of default mortgages would be
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easier to compare across mortgage offers. Information
would be more efficiently transmitted across the market.
Consumers would be likely to understand the key terms
and features of such standard products better than they
would alternative mortgage products. Price competition
would more likely be salient once features are standardized. Behaviorally, when alternative products are introduced, the consumer would be made aware that such
alternatives represent deviations from the default, helping
to anchor consumers in the terms of the default product
and providing some basic expectations for what ought to
enter into consumer choice. Framing the mortgage choice
as one between accepting a standard mortgage offer and
needing affirmatively to choose a non-standard product
should improve consumer decision-making. Creditors will
be required to make heightened disclosures about the risks
of the alternative loan products for the borrower, subject
to legal sanction in the event of failure reasonably to disclose such risks; the legal sanctions should deter creditors
from making highly unreasonable alternative offers, with
hidden and complicated terms. Consumers may be less
likely to make significant mistakes. In contrast to a pure
product regulation approach, the sticky default approach
would allow lenders to continue to develop new kinds of
mortgages, but only when they can adequately explain key
terms and risks to borrowers.

Requiring a default to be offered, accompanied by required heightened disclosures
and increased legal exposure for deviations,
may help to make “high road” lending more
profitable in relation to “low road” lending—
at least if deviations resulting in harm are
appropriately penalized.

Moreover, requiring a default to be offered, accompanied by
required heightened disclosures and increased legal exposure for deviations, may help to make “high road” lending
more profitable in relation to “low road” lending—at least
if deviations resulting in harm are appropriately penalized.
If offering an opt-out mortgage product helps to split the
market between high and low-road firms, and rewards the
former, the market may shift (back) towards firms that
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offer home mortgage products that better serve borrowers.
For this to work effectively, the default—and the efforts to
make the default sticky—would need to enable the consumer easily to distinguish the typical “good” loan, benefiting both lender and borrower, which would be offered
as the default, from a wide range of “bad” loans, including those that benefit the lender with higher rates and fees
but harm the borrower; those that benefit the borrower but
harm the lender; and those that harm the borrower and
lender but benefit third parties, such as brokers.
There will be costs associated with requiring an opt-out
home mortgage. For example, the sticky defaults may not
be sticky enough to alter outcomes, given market pressures. The default could be undermined, as well, through
the firm’s incentive structures for loan officers and brokers, which could provide greater rewards for non-standard loans. Implementation of the measure may be costly
and the disclosure requirement and uncertainty regarding
enforcement of the standard might reduce overall access to
home mortgage lending. There may be too many cases in
which alternative products are optimal, so that the default
product is in essence “incorrect,” and comes to be seen as
such. The default would then matter less over time, and
forcing firms and consumers to go through the process of
deviating from it would become increasingly just another
burden (like existing disclosure paperwork) along the road
to getting a home mortgage loan. Low-income, minority
or first-time homeowners who have benefited from more
flexible underwriting and more innovative mortgage
developments might see their access reduced if the standard set of mortgages does not include products suitable
to their needs.
One could improve these outcomes in a variety of ways.
For example, the opt-out regulation could require that the
standard set of mortgages include a 30-year fixed mortgage, a five- or seven-year adjustable rate mortgage, and
straightforward mortgages designed to meet the particular needs of first-time, minority or low-income homeowners. One might develop “smart defaults,” based on key
borrower characteristics, such as income and age. With a
handful of key facts, an optimal default might be offered
to an individual borrower. The optimal default would consist of a mortgage or set of mortgages that most closely
align with the set of mortgages that the typical borrower
with that income, age, and education would prefer. For
example, a borrower with rising income prospects might
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appropriately be offered a five-year adjustable rate mortgage. Smart defaults might reduce error costs associated
with the proposal and increase the range of mortgages that
can be developed to meet the needs of a broad range of borrowers, including lower-income or first-time homeowners;
however, smart defaults may add to consumer confusion.
Even if the consumer (with the particular characteristics
encompassed by the smart default) only faces one default
product, spillover from too many options across the market may make decision-making more difficult. Moreover,
it may be difficult to design smart defaults consistent with
fair lending rules.

The opt-out regulation could require that the
standard set of mortgages include a 30-year
fixed mortgage, a five- or seven-year adjustable rate mortgage, and straightforward
mortgages designed to meet the particular
needs of first-time, minority or low-income
homeowners.

Another approach to improve the standard mortgage choice
set and to reduce enforcement costs over time, would be
to build in banking agency supervision as well as periodic
required reviews of the defaults, with consumer experimental design or survey research to test both the products and the disclosures, so that the disclosures and the
default products stay current with updated knowledge of
outcomes in the home mortgage market. Indeed, lenders
might be required to conduct such research and to disclose
the results to regulators and the public upon developing a
new product and its related disclosures. In addition, regulators might use the results of the research to provide safe
harbors for disclosures that are shown to be reasonable ex
ante through these methods. Regulators could also issue
“no action” letters regarding disclosures that are deemed
to be reasonable through such research. The appropriate
federal and state supervisory agencies could be required
to conduct ongoing supervision and testing of compliance
with the opt-out regulations and disclosure requirements.
The federal and state banking agencies could easily adapt
to this additional role with respect to depositories, while
the FTC, a new expert consumer finance agency, or state

agencies would need to be provided with the authority
and resources to conduct ongoing supervisory and testing
functions for non-depositories, instead of relying solely on
enforcement actions. Through these no action letters, safe
harbors, supervision, and other regulatory guidance, the
regulators can develop a body of law that would increase
compliance across the diverse financial sectors involved in
mortgage lending, while reducing the uncertainty facing
lenders from the new opt-out requirement, and providing
greater freedom for financial innovation.

Restructure the Relationship Between
Brokers and Borrowers
An alternative approach to addressing the problem of market incentives to exploit behavioral biases would be to focus
directly on restructuring brokers’ duties to borrowers and
reforming compensation schemes that provide incentives
to brokers to mislead borrowers. Mortgage brokers have
dominated the subprime market. Brokers generally have
been compensated with “yield spread premiums” (YSP)
for getting borrowers to pay higher rates than those for
which the borrower would qualify. Such YSPs have been
used widely.9 In loans with yield spread premiums, unlike
other loans, there is wide dispersion in prices paid to mortgage brokers. As Howell Jackson has shown, within the
group of borrowers paying yield spread premiums, African
Americans paid $474 more for their loans, and Hispanics
$590 more, than white borrowers; thus, even if minority
and white borrowers could qualify for the same rate, in
practice minority borrowers are likely to pay much more.10

An alternative approach to addressing the
problem of market incentives to exploit
behavioral biases would be to focus directly
on restructuring brokers’ duties to borrowers
and reforming compensation schemes that
provide incentives to brokers to mislead borrowers. Mortgage brokers have dominated
the subprime market.
Brokers cannot be monitored sufficiently by borrowers
(See Jackson & Burlingame), and it is dubious that additional disclosures would help borrowers be better monitors
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(see, e.g., FTC 2007), in part because brokers’ disclosures
of potential conflicts of interest may paradoxically increase
consumer trust (Cain et al. 2005).11 Thus, if the broker is
required to tell the borrower that the broker works for himself, not in the interest of the borrower, the borrower’s trust
in the broker may increase: after all, the broker is being
honest! Moreover, evidence from the subprime mortgage
crisis suggests that while in theory creditors and investors
have some incentives to monitor brokers, they do not do
so effectively.
It is possible to undertake an array of structural changes
regarding the broker-borrower relationship. For example,
one could alter the incentives of creditors and investors to
monitor mortgage brokers by changing liability rules to
make it clear that broker misconduct can be attributed to
lenders and creditors in suits by borrowers (see Engel &
McCoy 2007). One could directly regulate mortgage brokers through licensing and registration requirements (as
is done elsewhere, e.g., in the UK); recent U.S. legislation
now mandates licensing and reporting requirements for
brokers. In addition, the ex post disclosure standard we
suggest might have a salutary effect by making it more
costly for lenders when brokers evade disclosure duties;
this may lead to better monitoring of brokers.

We also believe it is worth considering fundamentally altering the duties of brokers by
treating mortgage brokers as fiduciaries to
borrowers.

We also believe it is worth considering fundamentally
altering the duties of brokers by treating mortgage brokers
as fiduciaries to borrowers, similar to the requirements for
investment advisors under the Investment Advisors Act.
This would, of course, require vast changes to the brokerage
market, including to the ways in which mortgage brokers
are compensated, and by whom. We would need to shift
from a lender-compensation system to a borrower-compensation system, and we would need a regulatory system
and resources to police the fiduciary duty. An interim step
with much lower costs, and potentially significant benefits,
would be to ban yield spread premiums. Banning YSPs
could reduce some broker abuses by eliminating a strong
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incentive for brokers to seek out higher-cost loans for customers. In fact, quite recently a number of lenders have
moved away from YSPs to fixed fees with some funds held
back until the loan has performed well for a period of time,
precisely because of broker conflicts of interest in seeking
higher YSPs rather than sound loans. Banning YSPs now
would reinforce these “high road’ practices, and protect
against a renewed and profitable “low road” push for using
YSPs to increase market share once stability is restored to
mortgage markets. Banning YSPs would constitute a form
of scoring change, corresponding to regulation in the bottom right of Table 3 because it affects the payoff brokers
receive for pursuing different mortgage outcomes.

Behaviorally Informed
Credit Card Regulation
Using framing and salience in disclosures
to encourage good credit card behavior
Credit card companies have fine-tuned product offerings
and disclosures in a manner that appears to be systematically designed to prey on common psychological biases—
biases that limit consumer ability to make rational choices
regarding credit card borrowing.13 Behavioral economics
suggests that consumers underestimate how much they
will borrow and overestimate their ability to pay their bills
in a timely manner.14 Credit card companies can then price
their credit cards and compete on the basis of these fundamental human failings.15 Nearly 60% of credit card holders do not pay their bills in full every month.16 Moreover,
excessive credit card debt can lead to personal financial
ruin. Credit card debt is a good predictor of bankruptcy.17
Ronald Mann has argued that credit card companies seek
to keep consumers in a “sweat box” of distressed credit
card debt, paying high fees for as long as possible before
finally succumbing to bankruptcy.18
The 2005 bankruptcy legislation19 focused on the need
for improved borrower responsibility but paid insufficient
attention to creditor responsibility for borrowing patterns.
Credit card companies provide complex disclosures regarding teaser rates, introductory terms, variable rate cards,
penalties, and a host of other matters. Both the terms
themselves and the disclosures are confusing to consumers.20 Credit card companies are not competing, it appears,
to offer the most transparent pricing.
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Going forward, regulatory and legislative steps could help
prod the credit card industry into better practices. The
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency intervened to
require national banks to engage in better credit card practices and to provide greater transparency on minimum
payments,21 and the Federal Reserve recently released
proposed changes to its regulations under the Truth in
Lending Act (TILA), in part in the wake of TILA amendments contained in the bankruptcy legislation.22 Under the
proposals, for example, creditors would need to disclose
that paying only the minimum balance would lengthen the
payoff time and interest paid on the credit card; describe
a hypothetical example of a payoff period paying only the
minimum balance; and provide a toll-free number for the
consumer to obtain an estimate of actual payoff time.23
Although the very length and complexity of the Board’s
proposal hints at the difficulty of the task of using complex
disclosure to alter consumer understanding and behavior,
such improved disclosures might nevertheless help.

Congress could require that minimum payment terms be accompanied by clear statements regarding how long it would take, and
how much interest would be paid, if the customer’s actual balance were paid off only in
minimum payments, and card companies
could be required to state the monthly payment amount that would be required to pay
the customer’s actual balance in full over
some reasonable period of time

But we could do much better. Congress could require that
minimum payment terms be accompanied by clear statements regarding how long it would take, and how much
interest would be paid, if the customer’s actual balance were
paid off only in minimum payments, and card companies
could be required to state the monthly payment amount
that would be required to pay the customer’s actual balance
in full over some reasonable period of time, as determined
by regulation. These tailored disclosures use framing
and salience to help consumers, whose intuitions regarding compounding and timing are weak, to make better

informed payment choices based on their specific circumstances. Such an approach would correspond to changing
the rules in order to debias consumers with behaviorally
informed information disclosure, in the top right of table 3.
Although credit card companies have opposed such ideas
in the past, disclosures based on the customer’s actual balances are not overly burdensome.
Disclosures regarding the expected time to pay off actual
credit card balances are designed to provide a salient frame
intended to facilitate more optimal behavior. But such
disclosures may not be strong enough to matter. The disclosures are geared towards influencing the intention of
the borrower to change his behavior; however, even if the
disclosure succeeds in changing the borrower’s intentions,
we know that there is often a large gap between intention
and action.24 In fact, the borrower would need to change
his behavior in the face of strong inertia and marketing by
the credit card companies propelling him to make minimum payments. Furthermore, those market players who
are strongly opposed to such disclosures would promptly
attempt to undermine them once enacted with countervailing marketing and other policies.
An Opt Out Payment Plan for Credit Cards
A more promising approach, based on default rules establishing the starting point for behavior, rather than framing
of disclosures to change intentions, would be to develop
an “opt-out payment plan” for credit cards, under which
consumers would be required automatically to make the
payment necessary to pay off their existing balance over
a relatively short period of time unless the customer affirmatively opted-out of such a payment plan and chose an
alterative payment plan with a longer (or shorter) payment
term.25 Such an approach corresponds to changing the
rules through opt-out policies, in the top right of Table 3.
Given what we know about default rules and framing, such
a payment plan may be followed by many consumers. The
payment plan would create expectations about consumer
conduct and in any event inertia would cause many households simply to follow the plan. Increasing such behavior
would mean lower rates of interest and fees paid, and lower
incidence of financial failure. In any event, confronting an
optimal payment plan may force card holders to confront
the reality of their borrowing, and this may help to alter
their borrowing behavior, or their payoff plans. Moreover,
credit card industry players would find it difficult to argue
publicly against reasonable opt-out payment plans and, in
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the face of such plans, to continue using a pricing model
based on borrowers going into financial distress.

A more promising approach would be to
develop an “opt-out payment plan” for credit
cards, under which consumers would be
required automatically to make the payment
necessary to pay off their existing balance
over a relatively short period of time unless
the customer affirmatively opted-out of such a
payment plan and chose an alterative payment
plan with a longer (or shorter) payment term.

Of course, an opt-out payment plan will impose costs.
Some consumers who, in the absence of the opt-out payment plan, would have paid off their credit cards much
faster than the plan provides, might now follow the
slower payment plan offered as the default, thus incurring higher costs from interest and fees, possibly even
facing a higher chance of financial failure. Alternatively,
some consumers may follow the opt-out payment plan
when it is unaffordable for them, consequently reducing necessary current consumption such as medical
care or sufficient food, or incurring other costly forms of
debt. While there are undoubtedly problems with such
an approach, public debate over the proposal would at
least have the virtue of engaging all relevant players in
an important conversation about fundamental changes
in market practice.
Regulate Late Fees
A narrower intervention based on behavioral insights about
credit card customers would seek to change the behavior
of credit card firms, rather than consumers. One problem
with the pricing of credit cards is that credit card firms
can charge late and over-limit fees with relative impunity
because consumers typically do not believe ex ante that
they will pay such fees. In principle, firms need to charge
late and over-limit fees to the extent that they wish to provide incentives to customers not to pay late or go over their
credit card limits. In practice, given the fees they charge,
credit card firms are perfectly content to let consumers pay
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late and go over their card limits, in order to obtain fee
revenue from such occurrences.
We would change the scoring of the game (corresponding
to a regulatory choice in the bottom right of table 3). Under
our proposal, firms could deter consumers from paying
late or going over their credit card limits with whatever fees
they deemed appropriate, but the bulk of such fees would
be placed in a public trust to be used for financial education and assistance to troubled borrowers. Firms would
retain a fixed percentage of the fees to pay for their actual
costs incurred from late payments or over-limit charges, or
for any increased risks of default that such behavior presages. The benefit of such an approach is that it permits
firms to deter “bad conduct” by consumers, but prevents
firms from taking advantage of the psychological insight
that consumers predictably mis-forecast their own behavior with respect to paying late and borrowing over their
limit. Firm incentives to over-charge for late payments
and over-limit borrowing would be removed, while firms
would retain incentives appropriately to deter these consumer failures.
As with our other proposals, there would be costs as well:
in particular, the reduced revenue stream to lenders from
these fees would mean that other rates and fees would
be adjusted to compensate, and there is little reason to
believe that the adjustments would be in consumers’ favor.
Moreover, taxing late and over-limit fees in this manner
might be seen as a significant interference with contractual
relationships beyond the form and content of disclosures
required under TILA for credit card agreements.
Opt Out Credit Card
As a last option to consider in the credit card market, we
might think about regulation requiring firms to offer a standard “opt-out” credit card. Elizabeth Warren has argued
that private sector firms should offer “clean” credit cards
with straightforward terms and honest pricing.26 We agree
with her that this would be a significant achievement and
would set an important example for others. Looking at the
structure of the market, one wonders whether such a highroad firm offering a clean credit card could win market
share and remain profitable. Given predictable consumer
biases, such firms will have a hard time competing with
low-road players offering less transparent and seemingly
“better” offers. We thus wonder whether regulation might
be designed to reward high-road credit card firms offering
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such cards and penalize low-road firms offering products
designed to take advantage of consumer failings.

Consumers would be offered credit cards that
meet the definition of “safe.” They could opt
for another kind of credit card, but only after
meaningful disclosure. And credit card firms
would face increased liability risk if the disclosure is found to have been unreasonable.

Warren’s innovative suggestion in this regard is for the
creation of a consumer financial safety commission that
could review credit card offers.27 Perhaps an entity such
as this could specify terms and conditions that are “safe”
and qualify for being offered as a standard credit card. As
with the home mortgage idea discussed earlier, consumers would be offered credit cards that meet the definition
of “safe.” They could opt for another kind of credit card,
but only after meaningful disclosure. And credit card firms
would face increased liability risk if the disclosure is found
to have been unreasonable. As with our earlier concept, the
precise details of liability determination and consequences
would need to be carefully calibrated. In essence, the proposal would permit firms to continue to innovate in credit
card practices, but with strong anchoring around straightforward practices and with the risk of increased consequences to firms when consumers opt out and wind up in
trouble. This type of “sticky” opt-out provision, as with our
proposal for an opt-out home mortgage, would correspond
to changing both the rules and the scoring of the game on
the right side of Table 3.

Increasing Saving Among
LMI Households
We have focused in this paper thus far on improving outcomes in the credit markets using insights from behavioral
economics and industrial organization. Our focus derives
from the relative lack of attention to this area in the behavioral literature thus far. Savings is also an area ripe for further attention, however, because so much of saving policy
has focused on using defaults to improve retirement sav-

ing. For many low- and moderate-income households there
is a much greater need to focus on basic banking services
and short-term savings options, services which, for this
population, may require a different mix of governmental
responses than typically suggested in the context of retirement savings for middle- and upper-income households.
Many low- and moderate-income (LMI) individuals lack
access to the sort of financial services that middle-income
families take for granted, such as checking accounts or
easily-utilized savings opportunities. High cost financial
services, barriers to savings, lack of insurance, and credit
constraints increase the economic challenges faced by LMI
families. In the short run, it is often hard for these families
to deal with fluctuations in income that occur because of
job changes, instability in hours worked, medical illnesses
or emergencies, changes in family composition, or a myriad of other factors that can cause abrupt changes in economic inflows and outflows. At low income levels, small
income fluctuations may create serious problems in paying rent, utilities, or other bills. Moreover, the high costs
and low utility of the financial transaction services used by
many low-income households extract a daily toll on takehome pay. Limited access to mainstream financial services
reduces ready opportunities to save and thus limit families’
ability to build assets and to save for the future.

Market forces weaken or break down entirely
with respect to encouraging saving for lowincome households. This is simply because
the administrative costs of collecting smallvalue deposits are high in relation to banks’
potential earnings on the relatively small
amounts saved, unless the bank can charge
high fees; with sufficiently high fees, however,
it is not clear that utilizing a bank account
makes economic sense for LMI households.

In theory, opt-out policies ought to work well here, as
in the retirement world, in encouraging saving by such
households. However, while in general the market pulls
in the same direction as policy for saving, market forces
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weaken or break down entirely with respect to encouraging saving for low-income households. This is simply
because the administrative costs of collecting small-value
deposits are high in relation to banks’ potential earnings
on the relatively small amounts saved, unless the bank can
charge high fees; with sufficiently high fees, however, it
is not clear that utilizing a bank account makes economic
sense for LMI households. Indeed, the current structure
of bank accounts is one of the primary reasons why LMI
households do not have them.
With respect to transaction accounts, high minimum balance requirements, high fees for overdraft protection or
bounced checks, and delays in check clearance dissuade
LMI households from opening or retaining bank accounts.
Moreover, banks use the private ChexSystems to screen
out households who have had difficulty with accounts in
the past. Behaviorally insightful tweaks are unlikely to suffice in this context; rather, we need to devise methods to
change the nature of the products being offered and, with
them, the behavior of the consumers who open and maintain the accounts.
In this area, we need to figure out how to increase scale and
offset costs for the private sector, in addition to increasing
saving by low- and moderate-income families. As explained
more fully below, we propose two options: a new tax credit
to financial institutions for offering safe and affordable bank
accounts, and a proposal under which the IRS would direct
deposit tax refunds into “opt-out” bank accounts automatically set up through private sector financial institutions at
tax time. Both proposals are designed to induce the private
sector to change their account offerings by offering tax subsidies or government bundling to reach scale, as well as to alter
consumer behavior through the structure of the accounts
offered. The proposals pertain to changing the rules and the
scoring on the left hand side of Table 3, where markets may
prove neutral to, or even positively inclined towards, the
potential overcoming of consumer fallibility. In particular,
the tax credit and government backing change the scoring
to firms for offering such products, while the opt-out nature
of the proposal changes the starting rules.

Tax Credit to Financial Institutions for Offering
Safe and Affordable Bank Accounts
To overcome the problem of the high fixed costs of offering
sensible transaction accounts to low-income individuals
with low savings levels, Congress could enact a tax credit

16

for financial institutions for offering safe and affordable
bank accounts to LMI households (see Barr 2004, 2007).
The tax credit would be pay-for-performance, with financial
institutions able to claim tax credits for a fixed amount per
account opened by LMI households. The bank accounts
eligible for the tax credit could be structured and priced by
the private sector, but according to essential terms required
by regulation. For example, costly and inefficient checking accounts with high risk of overdraft or hidden, costly
features would be eschewed in favor of low-cost, low-risk
accounts with only debit card access. In particular, bank
accounts would be debit-card based, with no check-writing
capability, no overdrafts permitted, and no ChexSystems
rejections for past account failures, in the absence of fraud
or other meaningful abuse.

Congress could enact a tax credit for financial
institutions for offering safe and affordable
bank accounts to LMI households (see Barr
2004, 2007). The tax credit would be pay-forperformance, with financial institutions able
to claim tax credits for a fixed amount per
account opened by LMI households.

The power of the tax credit initiative could be significantly
increased if it were coupled with a series of behaviorally
informed efforts to improve take up of the accounts and
savings outcomes for account holders. For example, banks
could reach out to employers to encourage direct deposit
and automatic savings plans to set up default rules that
would increase savings outcomes. With an automatic savings plan, accounts could be structured so that holders
could designate a portion of their paycheck to be deposited into a savings “pocket”; the savings feature would rely
on the pre-commitment device of automatic savings, and
funds would be somewhat more difficult to access than
those in the regular bank account, in order to make the
commitment more likely to stick. To provide necessary
access to emergency funds in a more cost effective manner
than usually available to LMI households, the bank account
could also include a six-month consumer loan with direct
deposit and direct debit, using relationship banking and
automated payment systems to provide an alternative to
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costly payday loans. With direct deposit of income and
direct debit of interest and principal due, the loan should
be relatively costless to service and relatively low-risk for the
bank. With a longer payment period than usual for payday
lending, the loan should be more manageable for consumers living paycheck to paycheck, and would likely to lead
to less repeated borrowing undertaken to stay current on
past payday loans. Moreover, the loan repayment features
could also include a provision that consumers “pay themselves first,” by including a savings deposit to their account
with every payment. Such a pre-commitment device could
overcome consumer biases to procrastinate in savings, and
reduce the likelihood of the need for future emergency borrowing. All of these efforts would likely increase take up of
the banking product and improve savings outcomes from
becoming banked.

To provide necessary access to emergency
funds in a more cost effective manner than
usually available to LMI households, the
bank account could also include a six-month
consumer loan with direct deposit and direct
debit, using relationship banking and automated payment systems to provide an alternative to costly payday loans.

they would significantly reduce the costs of receiving one’s
tax refund. Once the tax refund account is set up through
the IRS-mechanism at tax time, households would receive
their tax refund in the account, weeks earlier than if they
had to wait for a paper check. Moreover, once it is established, the account could continue to be used long past tax
time. Households could also use the account just like any
other bank account—to receive their income, to save, to
pay bills, and the like.
By using an opt-out strategy and reaching households at
tax time, this approach could help to overcome consumer
biases to procrastinate in setting up accounts. By reducing the time it takes to receive a refund, setting up such
accounts could help to reduce the incentives to take out
costly refund loans, incentives that are magnified by temporal myopia and misunderstanding regarding the costs
of credit. It could dramatically, efficiently, and quickly
reach millions of LMI households and bring them into the
banking system. A complementary approach (Koide 2007)
would reach scale by using prepaid debit cards and pooled
accounts offered by a more limited number of vendors
chosen by the IRS, rather than individually-owned bank
accounts offered by a large number of financial institutions.
In that manner, the private sector vendor would be assured
large scale of operations. In either event, opt-out strategies
and government incentives would be coupled to reach lowincome households with essential banking services.

Conclusion
An Opt Out Bank Account for Tax Refunds
Congress could also enact a new, opt-out “tax refund
account” plan to encourage savings and expanded access to
banking services, while reducing reliance on costly refund
loans (see Barr 2007). Under the plan, unbanked lowincome households who file their tax returns would have
their tax refunds directly deposited into a new account.
Banks agreeing to offer safe and affordable bank accounts
would register with the IRS to offer the accounts, and a
fiscal agent for the IRS would draw from a roster of banks
offering these services in the taxpayer’s geographic area
in assigning the new accounts. On receiving the account
number from its fiscal agent, the IRS would directly
deposit EITC (and other tax refunds) into those accounts.
Taxpayers could choose to opt-out of the system if they did
not want to directly deposit their refund but the expectation is that the accounts would be widely accepted since

We have explored how existing regulation fails to take
account of advances in behavioral research about how people think and act. By contrast, behaviorally informed regulation would take account of the importance of framing
and defaults, of the gap between information and understanding, and between intention and action, as well as of
other psychological factors affecting how people behave.
At the same time, we argue, behaviorally informed regulation should take into account not only behavioral insights
about individuals, but also economic insights about markets. Markets can be shown to systematically favor overcoming behavioral biases in some contexts, and to systematically favor exploiting those biases in other contexts.
A central illustration of this distinction is the contrast
between the market for saving and the market for borrowing—in which the same human failing in understanding
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and acting upon the concept of compound interest leads
to opposite market reactions.

Behaviorally informed regulation would take
account of the importance of framing and
defaults, of the gap between information and
understanding, and between intention and
action, as well as of other psychological factors affecting how people behave.

Rather than relying on the classic model of rational agents
and maximizing firms, we have developed a model in
which we understand outcomes as an equilibrium interaction between individuals with specific psychologies and
firms that respond to those psychologies within specific
markets. As we have seen rather dramatically in the case of
subprime mortgages, for example, market outcomes may
not be socially optimal. To the extent that the interaction
produces real harms, regulation could potentially be usefully addressed to the social welfare failures, if any, in this
equilibrium. Taking both individuals and industrial organization seriously suggests the need for policy makers to
consider a range of market-context specific policy options,
including both changing the “rules” of the game, as well as
changing its “scoring.”
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We have sketched here ten policy suggestions derived
from our conceptual model. In particular, in the home
mortgage market, we have focused on a standards-based
truth in lending law, a requirement of full disclosure
of information favorable to the borrower, changing the
incentives in the relationship between brokers and borrowers, and a new, opt-out home mortgage system. With
respect to credit cards, we have explored more salient disclosures, an opt-out payment plan, an opt-out credit card,
and regulation of late fees. We have also suggested ways
in which behaviorally informed policy might promote
basic banking and savings beyond the retirement world,
for example, through an opt-out direct deposit account set
up at tax time, or through tax incentives to firms to offer
low-cost accounts.
It is noteworthy that our current framework largely retains
the classical perspective of consumers interacting in competitive markets. The difference is that consumers are now
shown to be fallible in systematic and important ways,
and firms are now understood to have incentives either
to overcome such fallibility, or to exacerbate it, in different specific market contexts. Recognition of the serious
social failures that can result from the interaction between
individual psychology and industrial organization ought to
lead to a range of behaviorally informed regulation of the
types that we have described here, in order to restore fair
and healthy competition.
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Notes
1 Michael S. Barr is Professor of Law, University of
Michigan Law School; senior fellow Center for American
Progress; nonresident senior fellow, Brookings Institution.
Sendhil Mullainathan is Professor of Economics, Harvard
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Ideas42, with support from the Hewlett Foundation and
the Russell Sage Foundation. The authors wish to thank
Ellen Seidman and the New America Foundation for suggesting we undertake this project and for their ongoing
support and encouragement.
2 These strategies have been called variously “Asymmetric
Paternalism,” “Libertarian Paternalism,” and “Debiasing
Through Law,” see, e.g., Camerer et al. (2003), Thaler &
Sunstein (2008), Jolls & Sunstein (2005).
3 We recognize that there are significant compliance
issues regarding pensions and retirement plans, disclosure
failures, fee churning and complicated and costly fee structures, conflicts of interest in plan management, as well as
problems with encouraging employers to sign up low-wage
workers for retirement plans. We do not mean to suggest
that these failings are trivial; far from it. We only mean to
suggest that, as a comparative matter, market incentives to
overcome psychological biases in order to encourage saving are more aligned with optimal social policy than market incentives to exacerbate psychological biases to encourage borrowing.
4 We use this bi-modal framework of regulatory choice
to simplify the exploration of how our model of individual psychology and firm incentives affects regulation. We
acknowledge that the regulatory choice matrix is more
complex (see Barr 2005b).
5 This is largely because of the existing regulatory
framework: pension regulation gives employers incentives
to enroll lower income individuals in 401(k) programs.
Absent this, it is likely that firms would be happy to discourage enrollment since they often must pay the match
for these individuals. This point is interesting because it
suggests that even defaults in savings only work because
some other regulation “changed the scoring” of the game.

6 See Federal Reserve Board, Final Rule Amending
Regulation Z, 12 CFR Part 226 (July 14, 2008); Summary
of Findings: Consumer Testing of Mortgage Broker
Disclosures, submitted to the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, July 10, 2008; Federal Reserve
Board, Proposed Rule Amending Regulation Z, 12 CFR
Part 226 (June 14, 2007), Federal Register 72, No. 114:
32948; Design and Testing of Effective Truth in Lending
Disclosures, Submitted to the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, May 16, 2007.
7 Elizabeth Warren, for example, has proposed a new
Financial Product Safety Commission, see Unsafe At Any
Rate, Democracy #8, Summer 2007.
8 A more aggressive approach would be to permit class
action litigation on an affirmative basis. In this paper, we
are not yet able to balance the costs of class action litigation
against the benefits of stronger enforcement.
9 See Jackson & Burlingame, supra, at 127. While in principle yield spread premiums could permit lenders legitimately to pass on the cost of a mortgage broker fee to a cash
strapped borrower in the form of a higher interest rate rather
than in the form of a cash payment, the evidence suggests
that yield spread premiums are in fact used to compensate
brokers for getting borrowers to accept higher interest rates,
prepayment penalties, and other loan terms.
10 Id. at 125; see also Jack Guttentag, Another View of
Predatory Lending 8 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working
Paper No. 01-23-B, 2000), available at http://fic.wharton.
upenn.edu/fic/papers/01/0123.pdf.
11 Cain, D.M., Lowenstein, G., & Moore, D.A. 2005,
The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing
Conflicts of Interest, Journal of Legal Studies, 34: 1-25.
12 We discuss this idea in further detail in Barr,
Mullainathan and Shafir (2008).
13 See generally Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1373 (2004).
14 Id. at 1395 – 96.
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15 Id. at 1394 – 95.
16 Brian K. Bucks et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family
Finances: Evidence from the 2001 and 2004 Survey of
Consumer Finances, Fed. Res. Bull., Mar. 22, 2006, at
A1, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/financesurvey.pdf.
17 Ronald Mann, Charging Ahead: The Growth and
Regulation of Payment Card Markets Around the World
60 – 69 (2006).

Self-predictions overweight strength of current intentions.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology.
25 Barr (2007). For a related proposal, see Robert Gordon
and Derek Douglas, “Taking Charge”, The Washington
Monthly (December 2005) (arguing for an opt-out direct
debit arrangement for credit cards).
26 Unsafe At Any Rate, Democracy #8, Summer 2007.
27 Id.

18 Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat
Box” of Credit Card Debt, Ill. Law. Rev. 1:375 (2007).
19 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq (2005)).
20 See, e.g., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Report 06-929,
Credit Cards: Increased Complexity in Rates and Fees
Heightens the Need for More Effective Disclosures to
Consumers (2006).
21 See, e.g., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
OCC Bull. 2003-1, Credit Card Lending: Account
Management and Loss Allowance Guidance (2003); Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Advisory Letter
2004-4, Secured Credit Cards (2004), available at http://
www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2004-4.doc; Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Advisory Letter 200410, Credit Card Practices (2004), available at http://www.
occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2004-10.doc..
22 See Press Release, The Federal Reserve Board, Proposed
Amendments to Regulation Z, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Press/bcreg/2007/20070523/
default.htm (May 23, 2007).
23 Id., Proposed Rule, 12 C.F.R. 226, proposed §.7(b)(12),
implementing 15 U.S.C. §1637(b)(11).
24 Buehler, R., Griffin, D., & Ross, M. (2002). Inside
the planning fallacy: The causes and consequences of
optimistic time predictions,” in T. Gilovich, D. Griffin,
& D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. Koehler, D.J., & Poon, C.S.K. (2005).
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